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Intelligence, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995, $ 140 (US), viii + 413 pp. ISBN
0-7923-3586-4
This is an ambitious book: it is not only an introduction to the formalities
of temporal logic, but also, as the sub-title is intended to indicate, a survey
of the many areas of philosophy and science in which temporal logic has
found and is nding application. Formally, the book is well presented and
evinces an impressive grasp of the range of the subject. There are discus-
sions of, among other things, the Sea Battle; the Master Argument; medieval
treatments of the logic of ampliation, duration, beginning and ceasing: fore-
knowledge and freedom;  Lukasiewicz's and Prior's contributions to the logic
of tenses; tense logic and special relativity; counterfactuals and tenses; tenses
and modality; tenses and computer science. As an introductory survey, the
book will undoubtedly be useful to readers wanting to gain a rapid under-
standing of part, or all, of its subject-matter; there are also frequent and
full references to further literature, and to results which the authors report
without themselves proving. The book achieves its aim of comprehensiveness
well, but it has to be said that it does so at the cost of some superciality,
especially in the more historical and philosophical passages. A few points
here must suce.
The discussion on the Sea Battle is unfortunately vitiated by the exces-
sive respect paid to Rescher's work on De Interpretatione. Rescher attempts,
against the natural reading of the text, to foist on Aristotle a realistic view
of statements about the future; his work also contains some simple factual
errors, such as the claim, innocently accepted by the authors (p.13), that
Aristotle's early Arabic commentators interpreted him realistically. The au-
thors are of course aware of the anti-realistic interpretation of Aristotle's ar-
gument, but they fail to present the best version of this interpretation. They
note, rightly, that  Lukasiewicz's three-valued approach will not as such t
Aristotle's text, since  Lukasiewicz set the truth-value of a disjunction with
neuter disjuncts to neuter. But it is clear that Aristotle, whatever his at-
titude to the Principle of Bivalence, does not want to abandon the Law of
Excluded Middle, so that on an anti-realist construal of his purpose, Aristo-
tle must be held to regard Fp _ :Fp as true, even if, for contingent p, each
disjunct lacks a standard truth-value. The authors simply leave the anti-
realist approach in an impasse (p. 194), making it look as if that approach,
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if it is to be fair to Aristotle, is obliged to adopt a highly counter-intuitive
non-truth-functional interpretation of the connectives. What the authors
fail to note is that van Fraassen's method of supervaluation can be, and
has been, applied to the anti-realist interpretation of Aristotle to yield an
indeterministic model of time which does not have these counter-intuitive
consequences.
Prior was originally attracted to an anti-realist approach to future con-
tingency, but came to abandon it when he saw the availability of what he
called a `Peircean' model of future truth, according to which all future con-
tingent statements are simply false. This sort of realism about the future is
surely unattractive: if one's intuitions about future contingency are realistic
at all, one is likely to nd more congenial on Ockhamist approach, accord-
ing to which a particular branch of the endlessly forking future is privileged
as representing the actual future, and contingent statements are evaluated
absolutely according as they hold or fail to hold on this branch. We know
from Prior's informal exposition of the Ockhamist position in Past, Present
and Future (p. 123) that it was just this kind of realism which he intended
to capture in his so-called `Ockhamist' model; but unfortunately the seman-
tics he gives for that model (pp. 126{7) fail to achieve that objective. This
point is well noted by the authors (p. 212), although they are unable, in
spite of their study of Prior's unpublished papers, to shed any light on why
the failure occurs. The problem is that although Prior indeed talks of an
`actual' assignment of a truth-value to a w (as opposed to a `prima facie'
assignment, which gives it a truth-value relative to a merely possible his-
tory) he does not supply any semantics for `actual' truth, and instead says
that `[a] formula is veried in an Ockhamist model if [sc. and only if] all
actual and prima facie assignments in the model give it truth' (ibid.), which
renders Fp, contrary to Ockham's intention, true i LFp. (Whether Fp
will also be false i LFp is false depends on whether the model presupposes
unrestricted Bivalence: Ockham himself did espouse unrestricted Bivalence,
of course, but Prior fails to be explicit about this point in his normalization
of the Ockhamist model's semantics.) The authors, as I have said, are aware
of this diculty in Prior's exposition, but they are subsequently careless in
suggesting (pp. 247, 266) that he does nevertheless succeed in formalizing
Ockham's version of realism about the contingent future.
The constraints imposed by the authors' ambitious project inevitably
mean that some of the more interesting philosophical issues connected with
time and tense get short shrift. Sometimes the authors' concision of approach
works well, as instanced by their neat despatch of McTaggart's Paradox.
But elsewhere they are too brusque with complex and delicate issues: for
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example, the authors simply claim, without argument, that counterfactual
dependence itself depends on a prior asymmetry between the open future
and xed past (p. 286) { an issue which cannot be settled by mere at.
More seriously, the authors' critical comparison between approaches to time
which give priority to the A-series and those which give priority to the B-
series is rather too laconic to be illuminating: at the end of their discussion,
for instance, the authors slip in the claim that only an A-theory can satis-
factorily account for the passage of time (p. 256). But the claim receives no
support and is anyway puzzling: A-concepts supply temporal perspective,
but is not obvious that they have any role to play in grounding a notion of
temporal passage (a notion which is in any case only dubiously coherent). In
general the authors' enthusiasm for the A-theory leads them, in my view, to
understate the extent to which an A-theory actually depends on a B-theory:
for there can surely be no such things as a temporal perspective without
the existence of an objective time-order which such a perspective is to be
directed.
The authors make brief sortie against those who have queried the very
enterprise of tense logic (p. 246), but again the campaign is to quickly over :
one gets no adequate sense of the strengths and weaknesses of the opposition,
and so cannot assess whether the authors have really scored a victory or
not. Here it would have been good if the authors had engaged with the very
interesting semantic reservations about the tense-logical project contained
in Gareth Evans's posthumously published paper `Does Tense Logic Rest on
a Mistake?' (in his Collected Papers). Evans's arguments are not, I think,
unanswerable: but they do at least deserve an answer. If the authors had
tried to embrace less of the (now vast) eld of the formal and philosophical
logic of tense, they would no doubt have left fewer avenues for criticism of this
sort, and would have been able to satisfy more of the philosophical qualms
one feels reading the book: still, there can be no doubt that what they have
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